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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 75 WINTER 2001 NUMBER 1
SYMPOSIUM
SECURITIES LAW FOR THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM: A FORWARD-
LOOKING STATEMENT
INTRODUCTION
MICHAEL A. PERINOt
This symposium on the future of the securities markets and
securities regulation is part of St. John's University School of
Law's year-long 75th anniversary celebration. Before we look to
the future, however, we need to look, as we have throughout our
diamond anniversary year, to the past and present.
The capital markets of today would be virtually
unrecognizable to those actively involved in the markets when
the law school was founded in 1925. In 1925 the New York Stock
Exchange (the "NYSE") was clearly the dominant market, while
today it is subject to fierce competition from NASDAQ. Since
1925, there has been an explosion of trading frequency. Daily
volume on the NYSE today regularly approaches or exceeds one
billion shares, while in 1925 it averaged less than two million.'
This rapid rise in trading frequency has been made possible by
advances in information processing capabilities that could only
f Assistant Professor, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to thank
John Barrett, John D'Alimonte, Francis Facciolo, Dave Harrington, Michael Simons,
and Brian Tamanaha for their comments on an earlier drafL of this introduction.
1 See ROBERT SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD 264 (1965).
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be dreamed of in 1925. Then stock trading was a paper-based
industry that required physical delivery of stock certificates
instead of the instantaneous shuffling of electronic bits and
bytes. 2 At that time a rigid system of fixed commissions existed
while today deregulation and competition have substantially
reduced transaction costs. 3  Institutional investors dominate
today's capital markets, but even the smallest investors have
instantaneous access to a wealth of company and market
information and can trade with the simple click of a mouse.
Advances in finance theory have radically altered conceptions of
risk and have given rise to a cornucopia of financial instruments
and trading strategies.4
Despite their differences, 1925 and 2000, at least as far as
the markets are concerned, bear some striking similarities. Both
periods of course have been marked by enormous growth. In
1925 alone, the Dow Jones Average rose nearly 27%; it was by
year-end more than double what it had been at the beginning of
1921, and it would continue to grow at a rapid pace until the
crash.5 The growth then and now was fueled in large part by
investment in new and burgeoning industries-the automobile,
electric utility, electronic, and chemical stocks in the 1920s, and
the Internet and computer industries in the 1990s. 6 Now and
then, after rapid market increases, commentary shifted to
bursting market bubbles. In both time periods the market has
occupied a very similar place in popular culture. As in the
Roaring Twenties, a sizeable portion of the present-day
population seems to be fixated on the daily gyrations of the
markets. In both periods there appears to be a widespread
2 Even into the 1960s, a brokerage firm might need more than thirty separate
documents to complete a stock transaction. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 489 (1982).
3 See id.
4 See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF
RISK (1996); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and
Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) ("The relatively recent origins and the
technical complexity of derivative instruments . . . make it difficult for the
uninitiated to evaluate the risks, and hence the regulatory strategies .... ."); Henry
Hu, Swaps: The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of the
Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1989) (discussing the
unprecedented rate at which financial institutions, fueled by advances in financial
theory, have been introducing capital market instruments and techniques).
5 See SOBEL, supra note 1, at 228.
6 See SOBEL, supra note 1, at 235-92; Greg Ip, Look at the Roaring '20s Finds
Optimistic Parallels, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2000, at C1.
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popular perception that the markets can be the vehicle for
overnight wealth.7
More importantly for purposes of this symposium, in 1925 a
substantial change in the scheme of securities regulation was in
sight. At that time the market was regulated almost entirely
through state blue-sky laws. Proponents of those statutes, which
existed in virtually every state by the mid-1920s, argued that
they were necessary to combat pervasive fraud,8 but it was
becoming increasingly apparent that state statutes were
inadequate to deal with burgeoning national businesses and
problems that transcended state boundaries.9 State laws were
typically filled with exceptions and exemptions, and they could
often be evaded just by making offerings across state lines or
through the mails.' 0 The federal securities laws were, in large
part, an attempt to remedy these weaknesses in state securities
laws."
Similarly important changes to federal securities regulation
may now also be in view. This time, however, the catalyst for
change is not an increasingly national market; instead, the
current system of securities regulation is coming under pressure
from: (1) the startlingly rapid changes in information technology
over the last decade; and (2) the shifts to an increasingly global
capital market.
It is, of course, not surprising that our securities markets
have felt the impact of these forces-after all, they are altering
7 These kinds of perceptions may be as old as the markets themselves. See
STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860, at 36 (1998).
8 SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 45. For differing accounts on the reasons for this
proliferation of state statues compare, VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING
IN AMERICA-A HISTORY 162-63 (1970) (stating that statutes were a response to
pervasive fraud) with Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue
Sky Laws, 70 TExY L. REV. 347, 350-52 (1991) (stating that statutes were largely
the product of chance, broader economic conditions, and local interest group
pressure).
9 See Gerald D. Nash, Government and Business: A Case Study of State
Regulation of Corporate Securities: 1850-1933, 38 BUS. HIST. REV. 144, 150 (1964).
10 See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 28-
29 (1970); Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 387-88; LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 148-52 (1989).
11 See SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1-39, 42-45; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 434-40 (1958); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1934); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 29,30-32 (1959).
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virtually every aspect of society today. But one could easily
argue that radical changes are nothing new for the markets.
The markets are always changing and adapting and securities
regulation has changed along with them. With respect to
information technology, the securities business has been and
remains an information processing business and has often
eagerly adopted the latest technological advances.' 2 One can
also take issue with whether the information technology
revolution and globalization are in fact distinct phenomena.
Globalization may simply be a by-product of advances in
information technology. At the very least, advances in
information technology may be a necessary condition for the kind
of globalization we see today. Indeed, it was the communications
and transportation advances of the early twentieth century that
facilitated the national capital markets of that time.
Consequently, it is not so much the fact of change that has
raised so many issues for securities regulation, but rather its
pace and scope. It is clear that advances in information
technology and globalization are radically altering the shape of
our securities markets, that the pace of change has quickened,
and that these forces will continue to have a considerable impact
for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it seems that every facet of
securities regulation and practice is in flux, and legislatures,
regulators, practitioners, and academics have struggled to keep
up with market developments.
Consider, for example, the offering process. Issuers
(particularly those in high technology) have been testing the
limits of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") has required cooling off
periods and re-circulation of prospectuses in cases where
Internet executives have used a variety of media to publicize
their companies' securities offerings during the quiet period.13
Electronic roadshows appear to be a permanent feature of the
offering landscape.' 4 The offering process has felt the effects of
12 Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of United States Securities Regulation in an
Age of Technological Uncertainty, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 83 (2001).
13 See, e.g., Suzanne McGee, Net Incubator divine interVentures' IPO Floats in
Limbo on Eve of Judgment Day, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2000, at C16.
14 See, e.g., Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 77,367 (Sept. 8, 1997); Private Financial Network, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %] 77,674 (Mar. 12,
1997).
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the Internet in a number of important areas, ranging from the
electronic delivery of the final prospectus to online offerings.'5
So far the SEC has taken a cautious, incremental approach
in adapting the offering process to the electronic age. Many of
the SEC's initiatives in this area appear predominantly to be
attempts to fit the current paper-based regulatory structure into
the information age. For example, the SEC continues to
advocate the so-called "envelope theory" under which
hyperlinked documents or documents on the same web site may
be considered as being delivered together in the same "virtual"
envelope.16 Under the envelope theory, an issuer has the
potential for Securities Act liability for statements contained in
these other sources, thereby creating disincentives for issuers to
use information technology to provide more and better quality
disclosure to potential purchasers.
This incremental approach is in many ways justified. The
offering process works reasonably well, particularly with respect
io companies that are engaging for the first time in a public
offering, and so it makes sense for the SEC to be cautious in
modifying it. Moreover, technological advances have not called
into question the securities laws' basic disclosure philosophy, so
radical alteration of our regulatory scheme seems unwarranted.
To its credit, the SEC has expressed willingness to adopt more
significant changes in the future.17 When those changes will
come and how aggressively the SEC will be willing to use its
authority to alter the offering process is impossible to say now.
Beyond these regulatory concerns, the advent of online
offerings has raised a host of questions about the role that the
current intermediaries (underwriters, accountants and lawyers)
will play in securities offerings. There have been some attempts
to market securities directly to investors, 8 but these efforts have
15 See, e.g., Use of Electronic Media, Exchange Act Release No. 42728, [2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 86,304, at 83,374 (Apr. 28, 2000).
16 Id. at 83,376-81.
17 For example, in one of the SEC's recent Internet releases, the SEC analyzed
whether an issuer's or intermediary's delivery obligations could be satisfied by
posting the document to a web site. The SEC concluded that such an "access-equals-
delivery" model was inappropriate at this time because of concerns that electronic
media was not "universally accessible and accepted" by investors. Id. at 83,388,
83,390. The implication of the release, however, is that such a day will come, and,
indeed, the SEC requested data that would support an access-equals-delivery
model. Id.
18 See IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
2001]
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been almost entirely confined to fit within current registration
exemptions. 19 Complete disintermediation for all offerings is
unlikely because of the important reputational capital and other
benefits that they provide to new, untested issuers. 20 Although
we can recognize that intermediaries are likely to have a role in
the offering of the future, we can perceive only dimly what the
securities offering process will look like in ten or twenty years.
Advances in information technology have also renewed
concerns about the relationship between the transactional
disclosure philosophy of the Securities Act and the periodic
disclosure philosophy of the Exchange Act. Commentators have
regularly proposed company (as opposed to transactional)
registration in one form or another since at least the mid-
1960s.21 The SEC has on occasion taken steps down this road,
particularly with respect to the integrated disclosure system and
the shelf-registration process. 22 The SEC's most recent and
substantial attempts at innovation on company registration
proposals-the one made in 1996 by the Advisory Committee on
Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes 23 and the ensuing
"Aircraft Carrier" Release 24- have not been successful.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 77,252 (July 26, 1996); Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec .L. Rep. (CCH) 78,906 (July 14, 1999); Real Goods
Trading Corp., Sec No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,226 (June 24, 1996).
19 See 17 C.F.R. 230.501-230.506; Regulation D. Revisions, 53 Fed. Reg. 7866,
7866-68 (Mar. 10, 1988).
20 See Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and
Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 823-35 (1997) (asserting that
intermediaries facilitate exchanges between traders, provide liquidity to the
markets, and play a major role in price-setting).
21 See Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for
Technology Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 770-77 (1997) (stating that
in an electronic disclosure environment, the concept of 10-K and 10-Q should be
eliminated in favor of a unitary company registration "fie" which contains all
material required under Reg. S-K and includes management's discussion and risk
analysis); Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340,
1341-42 (1966) (advocating for a coordinated disclosure system); AMER. LAW INST.,
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980) (discussing the fact that while the 1933 and 1934
Acts provided for the registration of securities, the Holding Company and
Investment Company Acts contemplate registration of companies).
22 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.3 (1995).
23 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,834, at
88,403-04 (July 24, 1996) (advocating that SEC adopt a company-based registration
system).
24 The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7606,
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20011 INTRODUCTION
Our current federal regulatory structure is also under strain
from the increasing globalization of the capital markets, just as
the state structure of 1925 was under strain from the
increasingly national capital markets of that time. Globalization
of the capital markets raises a host of issues, ranging from the
ability of market participants to engage in regulatory arbitrage25
to the harmonization of international accounting standards.26
Market participants may also seek to evade the U.S. regulatory
regime improperly. For example, there is substantial evidence
that issuers misused the Regulation S exemption for offshore
offerings to issue securities that ultimately were intended for
distribution in the United States, and the SEC has taken
substantial steps to limit those practices.27 Globalization has
also resulted in more frequent cross-border transactions, thereby
raising important issues about the interplay between differing
corporate and securities regimes. 28
Our primary equity markets, the NYSE and NASDAQ, have
been subject to increasing competition from rival markets, both
abroad and at home. European stock markets are in a period of
consolidation and a true pan-European market does not seem far
63 SEC Docket (CCH) 835 (Nov. 3, 1998) (proposing integrating private and public
offerings and seeking to apply the private issuer advantage of flexibility in
disclosure to the public market).
25 Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets:
Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 349, 350
(1990) (noting that in global capital markets "sophisticated investors have...
latitude to structure their transactions to take advantage of international
differences in regulatory regimes").
26 See, e.g., International Accounting Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
7801, 34-42430, 71, SEC Docket (CCH) 1551 (Feb. 16, 2000) (noting that the
increasing amount of global financial transactions necessitates the development of
high-quality, transparent and readily comparable international accounting
standards).
27 See Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7505, 34-39668,
66 SEC Docket (CCH) 1069 (Feb. 17, 1998) (noting that the Regulation S exemption
has been "used as a means of perpetrating fraudulent and manipulative schemes,
especially schemes involving the securities of thinly capitalized or 'microcap'
companies").
28 See Joseph A. Flom, Mergers and Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 753, 763 (2000) (stating that the nineties saw liberalization of
government restrictions facilitating the ability to effect major international and
domestic transactions). The SEC recently modified its regulatory framework for
certain international transactions. See Exemptions for Cross-Border Rights
Offerings, Exchange Offers and Business Combinations, 17 C.F.R. 230.800-02
(2000).
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Off.2 9 In the United States, the traditional stock markets have
lost significant volume to electronic communications networks
(ECNs)30 and other alternative trading systems. Some of the
ECNs, which were originally regulated as broker-dealers, 31 are
filing to become registered exchanges. Others remain broker-
dealers, and are, therefore, subject to oversight by the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). The NYSE and
NASDAQ have responded to these developments by seeking
global alliances with other exchanges 32 and by proposing to "de-
mutualize," e.g., to become for profit, privately owned entities. 33
These developments raise a host of questions about the basic
self-regulatory structure of the securities markets. Will for-
profit entities focused on the bottom line devote sufficient
resources to compliance and enforcement? Does it make sense for
competing markets to maintain overlapping or duplicative
regulatory arms, or should this function be consolidated in a
single regulator? If a single regulator model is chosen, will we be
simply creating another, pseudo-private SEC? Can or should the
NASD be in a position to regulate its market competitors?
The success and proliferation of alternative trading systems
has raised other structural issues as well. These systems are not
fully integrated into the National Market System and trading
among institutions that are not required to report the price and
volume of transactions may adversely affect market
29 See Jack Ewing, Bourse on the Prowl, BUS. WK., Sept. 25, 2000, at 74; Silvia
Ascarelh & John Carreyrou, Merger Creates 3rd Bloc to Woo Smaller Markets
Within Europe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at A18.
30 An ECN is a computer-based trading system that permits primarily
institutional investors to trade directly with each other. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS
ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 28 (8th ed. 2000). For a
general discussion of ECNs, see SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF
MARKET REGULATION, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND AFTER-
HOURS TRADING (June 2000) at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ecnafter.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2001)
31 Regulation ATS permits ECNs to choose whether to register as broker-
dealers or exchanges. See 17 CFR § 242.301 (2000).
32 See Greg Ip, Mark Heinzel & John Carreyrou, NYSE Talks to Markets in
Latin America, Europe, Canada About Possible Alliances, WALL ST. J., May 10,
2000, at C1.
3 See Robert McGough, Money Managers Need Convincing on Big Board IPO,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 1999, at Cl; Greg Ip, Trading Places: The Stock Exchanges,
Long Static, Suddenly Are Roiled by Change, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1999, at Al;
John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Self-Regulation of Stock Exchanges, N.Y. L.J.,
May 20, 1999, at 5.
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transparency.34  While competition among trading markets
promises reduced transaction costs, it has also raised the specter
of fragmentation that might limit the ability of market
participants to obtain best execution. The SEC has implied that
the answer to the fragmentation problem may be a Central Limit
Order Book, or CLOB.35 The CLOB proposal has met with
criticism, which primarily suggests that a CLOB would inhibit
competition, particularly with respect to speed of execution or
liquidity.36 Others, including NASDAQ, have floated their own
market structure proposals.37 At the same time the markets are
addressing these issues, they are also implementing
decimalization, which is expected to increase price competition
and reduce spreads.38
Technological change and globalization also raise important
issues for securities enforcement and litigation. From teenagers
accused of using the Internet to manipulate stocks 39 to phony
electronic press releases that temporarily carve billions in
market capitalization from public issuers,40 the Internet seems
34 See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 30, at 29.
35 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
by the New York Stock Exchange to Rescind Exchange Rule 390; Commission
Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act
Release No. 42450, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 86,238
(Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 42450]. A CLOB links
together all market centers in order to compile the limit orders and price quotes
from the different markets and trading systems. See Julie Kosterlitz, Market Forces,
NAT'L J., Feb. 19, 2000, at 533. A CLOB would also accord a strict price/time
priority to order execution. See Exchange Act Release No. 42450, at 83,017.
36 See JENNINGS, MARSH, COFFEE, & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 41.
37 See Gretchen Morgenson, A New Plan Recalls the Old Nasdaq, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2000, Sec. 3, at 1 (discussing NASDAQ Supermontage proposal). For an
overview of these proposals, see Roberta S. Karmel, Confronting Market Structure-
Dgjb vu All Over Again, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 17, 2000, at 3.
3s See John C. Coffee, Mysteries of the National Market System, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
23, 1992, at 5 (describing the benefits of decimilization as a form of price
competition). But see, Greg Ip, Stock Prices Switch to Decimals From Fractions,
Raising Concerns About 'Front-Running' by Pros, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2000 at C1
(discussing anticipated problems associated with the switch to decimal stock prices
in the United States).
39 See Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Says Teenager Had After-School Hobby:
Online Stock Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at Al (SEC accused teenager of
developing a scheme to increase prices of nine obscure, low-price stocks he
purchased by sending optimistic message to investing chat rooms on the internet).
40 See Terzah Ewing, Peter Waldman & Matthew Rose, Bogus Report Sends
Emulex on a Wild Ride, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2000, at C1 (discussing the
"lightening quick" way that word spreads online and in the media and the effect this
can have on the stock market); Mark Maremont, Extra! Extra!: Internet Hoax, Get
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to be the vehicle of choice for a variety of securities scams. While
many of these scams appear to be traditional frauds effectuated
through a new medium,41 that new medium allows perpetrators
to have a much wider impact for a much lower cost than was
possible in traditional boiler room schemes.42  In a global
securities market, it is also reasonable to expect more frequent
questions to arise with respect to the extraterritorial application
of the federal securities laws,43 as well as an increased need for
cooperation among securities regulators.
Debate continues to rage over the utility of private
enforcement of the federal securities laws, despite passage of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PSLRA")44
and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (the
"SLUSA").45 Indeed, a host of unintended consequences have
arisen as attorneys have adapted strategically to the procedural
and substantive changes those acts wrought.46  On the
technology front, one of the most important developments in the
last five years is the increased importance of the Internet as a
tool to disseminate information about securities class action
lawsuits. 47 Entrepreneurial plaintiffs attorneys have also used
the Internet to attract potential lead plaintiffs in order to
the Details, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at C1 (discussing the impact of the internet
on the stock market).
41 See, e.g., SOBEL, supra note 1, at 248-49 (describing a number of
manipulation schemes in the 1920s).
42 See generally Michael Schroeder, Growth in Internet Securities Fraud Will Be
Difficult to Combat, GAO Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1999, at C15 (stating that
rapid growth of online securities scams create a significant problem and regulators
will have difficulty coordinating internet policing activities because of insufficient
human and technical resources).
43 See, e.g., SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (involving
an SEC investigation of an off-shore trust); Europe and Overseas Commodity
Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (foreign entity
entitled to some protection under anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws);
Kauther SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing foreign
shareholder to sue based, inter alia, on the federal securities laws).
Pub.L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77z-1, 77z-2,
78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-5).
45 Pub.L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 77p, 77z-1, 77v,
78bb).
46 See generally MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIEs LITIGATION AFTER THE
REFORM ACT (2000).
47 One of the more significant developments has been the creation of the
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse at Stanford Law School
(http://securities.stanford.edu), which provides online access to complaints and other
pleadings in securities class actions filed since passage of the PSLRA.
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compete for the lucrative lead counsel position.48  Private
securities litigation remains in an evolutionary phase, and it is
unclear precisely where that process will lead.
And so in 2000 as in 1925, we appear to be on the cusp of
change. What will the capital markets of tomorrow look like and
how can securities regulation change to meet them? It is
anybody's guess where these changes will take us. Prediction is
a hazardous business, and we have not given our symposium
participants the impossible task of divining the future. Instead,
this symposium has a more modest goal. Even if we cannot
predict the future, we can identify the significant policy issues
we will have to grapple with in this brave new world. Having
identified those issues, we can then establish a framework for
helping to resolve them. At the very least, we can identify the
principles that should guide us in addressing those issues.
In this publication, we are fortunate to have articles from a
distinguished group of academics, regulators, and practitioners
that explore these issues. Professor Joseph A. Grundfest of
Stanford Law School begins this exploration by broadly
examining the principles that should guide the SEC's approach
to technology issues. He argues that the success and quality of
the United States regulatory regime hinges on the SEC's ability
to adopt a technology strategy that is geared toward
understanding and adapting to the rapid pace of innovation.
Perforce, that strategy will require the SEC to develop a set of
predictions about how technology will evolve in the future and
what those changes will mean for the securities markets.
Recognizing the difficulty of making these predictions, Professor
Grundfest advocates that the SEC adopt a flexible and varied
technology strategy. Under certain circumstances, that may call
for a "technology-forcing" approach, under which the SEC
compels the industry to move in a certain direction.
Alternatively, the path of technological innovation and its impact
on the markets may be unclear, suggesting that the SEC should
take a "wait-and-see" approach. Professor Grundfest then
outlines a variety of current technology-based issues-ranging
from market fragmentation to market manipulation through the
use of bogus Internet press releases-and discusses how the SEC
might employ different strategies to address those issues.
48 See PERINO, supra note 46, at 2027.
20011
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Annette Nazareth, the SEC's Director of the Division of
Market Regulation, reviews the important market structure
issues that the SEC is currently addressing. Do changes in
information technology require a radical reworking of the
National Market System? To answer that question, Ms.
Nazareth focuses on three basic structural questions that the
SEC has begun to address: (1) market center competition; (2)
order interaction; and (3) price transparency and linkages among
markets. From these examples, Ms. Nazareth elucidates the
general principles that underlie the SEC's responses to market
structure issues. In particular, she first notes that the SEC
tends to favor competition and flexibility over rigid regulatory
edicts. Second, the SEC favors investor interests to protecting
market centers or participants. Finally, the SEC has only been
willing to impose solutions in the relatively rare subset of cases
in which self-regulatory initiatives have been insufficient to
address practices that are harmful to the National Market
System or that impair investor confidence.
John D'Alimonte, Mary Carty, and Thomas Finkelstein from
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher provide practitioners' perspectives on
securities offerings in the electronic age. To set the stage for that
discussion, the authors review both the historical underpinnings
of the federal securities laws and the various proposals made
over the last 35 years to overhaul those acts, particularly those
proposals geared toward company registration. The authors
then provide a ground level view of the characteristics of today's
capital markets that have resulted in so much strain on the
traditional regulatory framework. In particular, they address
why a company-based registration model provides a much better
fit with today's fast-paced, diverse, global capital markets than
the traditional transaction-oriented model. The authors discount
the likelihood of radical legislative or regulatory reform of the
offering process in the near term but do offer some suggestions
about changes the SEC can make to better meet the needs of
today's capital market participants.
Max Berger, John P. Coffey, and Gerald H. Silk from
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP examine the
changing face of private securities litigation from the perspective
of the plaintiffs class action attorney. When Congress passed
the PSLRA it hoped to encourage institutional investors to take
a more active role in the prosecution of securities fraud class
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actions by creating the lead plaintiff provision.49  So far,
institutions have stepped forward to serve as lead plaintiffs in a
relatively small number of cases, in large part because there are
significant disincentives to institutional participation as lead
plaintiff combined with very uncertain upside gain from taking
on that role. Mr. Berger has been among the most successful
attorneys in attracting institutions as clients in securities class
actions. From this practical background, he and his co-authors
examine some of the benefits of institutional participation as
lead plaintiffs, analyze some of the strategic adaptations the lead
plaintiff provisions have engendered, and evaluate the prospects
for future increased levels of institutional activism in securities
litigation.
In sum, these articles illustrate the dynamic nature of
securities regulation and the capital markets today. We hope
that this symposium will provide guidance to those working in
this important area about how best to address today's and
tomorrow's changes in the capital markets.
49 See id. at 2029.
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